HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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### Important Information

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BRISBANE REGISTRY No B66 of 2022

BETWEEN: **CRIME AND CORRUPTION COMMISSION**
Appellant

and

**PETER DAMIEN CARNE**
Respondent

# INTERVENER'S SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF QUEENSLAND

## Part I: Publication

1. These submissions are in a form suitable for publication on the internet.

## Part II: Basis for intervention

2. The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland (**the Speaker**) seeks leave to intervene in the appeal as an intervener, or, in the alternative, to be heard as *amicus curiae*.[1] The Speaker intervenes in support of the appellant (**the Commission**).

3. The Speaker seeks to make submissions about parliamentary privilege and whether the document at the centre of the appeal, and its preparation, are protected by parliamentary privilege. The submissions ultimately go beyond those made by the Commission.

## Part III: Why leave should be granted

4. *Intervener.* The Speaker has an indirect interest in the proceedings because these proceedings will affect the scope of parliamentary privilege in Queensland, which the Speaker has a role in administering. This role is established pursuant to the *Parliament of Queensland Act* 2001 (Qld) (**POQ Act**):

[1] On the bases set out in *Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd* (2011) 248 CLR 37 at 39 [2] – [4], [6].

(a) the Speaker is elected by members of the Legislative Assembly (**the Assembly**) to preside at all meetings of the Assembly (s 14), and is the chairperson of the Committee of the Legislative Assembly (s 82); and

(b) the Committee of the Legislative Assembly has responsibility for parliamentary powers, rights and immunities, which includes the powers, rights and immunities of the Assembly and its committees and members: ss 84(b) and 87.

5. Accordingly, the Speaker chairs the committee with responsibility for parliamentary privilege. The Court's determination about the scope of the privilege will affect the Speaker's future work.

6. Further, the submissions of the Speaker go beyond those of the Commission in the following two principal ways:

(a) The Speaker provides submissions on the history of privilege in Queensland in particular, which include the observation that the scope of the privilege in Queensland is now likely wider than when it was regulated only by the wording of article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.[2] The Commission does not address the full statutory history in Queensland, nor expressly contend that the privilege has been widened by statute. The alteration of the scope of a well-established immunity by modern statute is an important matter of principle.

(b) The Speaker addresses in detail whether the *preparation* of the Report is privileged, as distinct from whether the Report itself is privileged. The Speaker submits the preparation is plainly privileged given the wide terms of the POQ Act.

7. *Amicus curiae.* Alternatively, the Speaker should be granted leave to appear as *amicus curiae* because the Court would be significantly assisted by the submissions of the Speaker identified at paragraph 6, above. The Speaker was granted leave to appear as *amicus curiae* at first instance and in the Court of Appeal.

## Part IV: Argument

8. The Speaker provides submissions on the following three matters:

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[2] 1 Will & Mary, sess 2, c 2.

(a) the history of the scope of parliamentary privilege in Queensland, including an explanation of how its scope has widened since the enactment of the *Parliamentary Papers Act* 1992 (Qld) (heading **A.**);

(b) that the Report itself is plainly privileged, but that of itself does not preclude making a declaration about its preparation – unless the preparation is also privileged (heading **B.**); and

(c) that the preparation of the Report was part of the proceedings of the Assembly pursuant to s 9(2)(e) of the POQ Act, and thus the Court is not empowered to enquire into whether there were breaches of procedural fairness in its preparation (heading **C.**).

## A. History of parliamentary privilege in Queensland

9. The Speaker adopts paragraphs 25 to 27 of the Appellant's Submissions relating to the origins and nature of article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.[3]

10. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 provides:

> That the Freedom of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.

11. The *Constitution Act* 1867 (Qld) provided for the Queensland legislature. It did not contain a provision expressly dealing with parliamentary privilege. Section 40A of that Act was inserted in 1978[4] and provided as follows:

> **40A. Powers, privileges and immunities of Legislative Assembly.**
> The powers, privileges and immunities to be held, enjoyed and exercised by the Legislative Assembly and the members and committees thereof shall be such as are defined by any Act or Acts so far as those powers, privileges and immunities are not inconsistent with this Act or any other Act and until so defined shall be those powers, privileges and immunities held, enjoyed and exercised for the time being by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and its members and committees so far as those powers, privileges and immunities are not inconsistent with this Act or any other Act, whether held, possessed or enjoyed by custom, statute or otherwise.

12. Further, s 5 of the *Imperial Acts Application Act* 1984 (Qld) relevantly provided that the Bill of Rights 1688[5] continues to have the same force and effect as it had in Queensland immediately prior to the commencement of that Act.

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[3] 1 Will & Mary, sess 2, c 2.
[4] By the *Constitution Act Amendment Act* 1978 (Qld).
[5] 1 Will & Mary, sess 2, c 2.

13. *Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission* (1992) 175 CLR 564 (***Ainsworth***) was decided in this statutory context. At that time, there was no provision similar to s 9 of the POQ Act, defining "proceedings in the Assembly".

14. In *Ainsworth*, the Criminal Justice Commission, upon request and in exercise of its functions under the *Criminal Justice Act* 1989 (Qld), made and delivered a report to the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee, the Speaker and the relevant Minister. Under the *Criminal Justice Act*, once a report was furnished to the chair of the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee, the Speaker and the relevant Minister, it was tabled and printed and "granted all the immunities and privileges" of a report tabled and printed by order of the Assembly.[6] The report, the preparation of which had been requested by the relevant Minister, made adverse comment about Mr Ainsworth. The High Court declared that the Commission had failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness in preparing the report.

15. The majority (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) did not consider the issue of parliamentary privilege. Brennan J noted the respondent's argument that the report, on being printed, attracted the immunities and privileges of a report tabled in and printed by order of the Legislative Assembly, but said this character of the report was immaterial to the making of the declaration.[7]

16. Justice Davis, at first instance in this matter, said that "because the preparation of the report [in *Ainsworth*] was antecedent to the right of the Speaker to table the document, parliamentary privilege did not extend to acts or omissions in preparing the report".[8] Importantly, at the time of *Ainsworth*, there was no statutory provision that specifically provided that the preparation of a document for the purpose of submitting it to the Assembly or a committee was protected by privilege – such as s 9(2)(e) of the POQ Act.[9] The making of the declaration in *Ainsworth* thus does not tell against the conclusion that the *preparation* of the document at the centre of these proceedings is privileged and protected from scrutiny.

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[6] *Criminal Justice Act 1989* (Qld), s 2.18; see *Ainsworth* (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 570 – 571.
[7] *Ainsworth* (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 587.
[8] CAB 38: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [93], citing the explanation of Helman J in *CJC & Ors v Dick* [2000] QSC 272 at [8].
[9] *Ainsworth* was decided prior to the commencement of the *Parliamentary Papers Act* 1992 (Qld); see CAB 39: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [94].

17. The *Parliamentary Papers Act* 1992 (Qld) commenced on 2 July 1992.[10] Section 3 expressly defined "proceedings in Parliament" and, in doing so, likely widened the scope of parliamentary privilege in Queensland:

> **Meaning of "proceedings in Parliament"**
> **3.(1)** This section applies for the purposes of—
> (a) article 9 of the Bill of Rights (1688) as applying to the Queensland Parliament; and
> (b) this Act.
> **(2)** All words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to, transacting business of the House or a committee are **"proceedings in Parliament"**.
> **(3)** Without limiting subsection (2), **"proceedings in Parliament"** include—
> …
> (c) presenting or submitting a document to the House, a committee or an inquiry; and
> (d) a document laid before, or presented or submitted to, the House, a committee or an inquiry; and
> (e) preparing a document for the purposes of, or incidental to, transacting business mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c); and
> (f) preparing, making or publishing a document (including a report) under the authority of the House or a committee; and
> (g) a document (including a report) prepared, made or published under the authority of the House or a committee.
> …

18. In the Second Reading Speech, Mr Matthew Foley, Chairman of the Select Committee of Privileges, explained that the Act would clarify and extend privilege so that it covered Hansard proofs and other matters about which there was some uncertainty as to the status of privilege.[11] Mr Foley noted that the Bill "defines the concept of 'proceedings in Parliament' for the purposes of the application of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights to the Queensland Parliament", and that there was a need for Parliament to ensure its "privileges are clarified and fine tuned to keep them relevant to modern times".[12] These observations are consistent with an intention that the *Parliamentary Papers Act* altered the scope of parliamentary privilege in Queensland.

19. *Criminal Justice Commission v Parliamentary Criminal Justice Commissioner* [2002] 2 Qd R 8 (***CJC v PCJC***) was decided in this statutory context. In that matter,

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[10] See *Criminal Justice Commission v Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee* [2002] 2 Qd R 8 (***CJC v PCJC***) at 20 [20] (McPherson JA).
[11] Queensland, Hansard of the Legislative Assembly, 21 May 1992, at 5437 – 5438.
[12] Queensland, Hansard of the Legislative Assembly, 21 May 1992, at 5438 and 5439. Mr Foley also said, "We must ensure that parliamentary privilege is kept up to date and appropriate for modern needs."

the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Commissioner (**the Parliamentary Commissioner**), upon the request of the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee, conducted an investigation and prepared a report in which she concluded that the Criminal Justice Commission (**CJC**) had made an unauthorised disclosure of information. The CJC sought various declarations in the Supreme Court of Queensland, including that the report was *ultra vires* and there was a breach of procedural fairness obligations in its preparation. McPherson JA observed that the following facts, standing alone, "might well raise issues about the applicability of art. 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688":[13]

(a) that the Parliamentary Commissioner was an officer of the Parliament;

(b) that the Parliamentary Committee was a watchdog over the CJC;

(c) that the Parliamentary Commissioner was an independent agent of the Committee; and

(d) the Committee's functions included requesting the Parliamentary Commissioner to investigate unauthorised disclosures of information.

20. However, the scope of "proceedings in Parliament' was put beyond doubt by the terms of s 3 of the *Parliamentary Papers Act*. McPherson JA stated:[14]

> There is no doubt that art. 9 of the Bill of Rights has always formed part of the law of Queensland. Unlike some other Australian States, Queensland came into existence as a separate entity in 1859 with a representative form of Parliamentary government to which the Bill of Rights was immediately capable of being attracted. The privileges conferred by art. 9 are, in any event, now comprehended by s. 40A of the Constitution Act 1867 and its application to Queensland is expressly recognised in s. 3(1) of the 1992 Act. It may be, as some have claimed, that it already encompassed the matters now specified in ss 3(2) and 3(3) of that Act; but, whether or not that is so, the enacted law on the subject is now placed beyond doubt. In determining what ''proceedings of Parliament'' may not be questioned in any court out of the Parliament, that expression bears the meaning ascribed to it by those provisions of the 1992 Act. [underlining added]

21. His Honour concluded, *inter alia*, that the process undertaken by the Parliamentary Commissioner in conducting the investigation with a view to publication of the report was covered by s 3(3)(f) of the *Parliamentary Papers Act*.[15]

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[13] *CJC v PCJC* [2002] 2 Qd R 8 at 20 [19].
[14] *CJC v PCJC* [2002] 2 Qd R 8 at 21 [21].
[15] *CJC v PCJC* [2002] 2 Qd R 8 at 21 [22].

22. The POQ Act was assented to in December 2001. Sub-sections 9(1) and (2) of the POQ are in substantially the same terms as sub-ss 3(2) and (3) of the *Parliamentary Papers Act*, replacing the term "Parliament" with "Assembly".[16]

23. It is to be borne in mind that s 9 of the POQ Act defines and gives content to the phrase "proceedings in the Assembly". The enactment of sub-ss 3(2) and (3) of the *Parliamentary Papers Act*, as replicated in s 9 of the POQ Act, has widened the meaning of "proceedings in Parliament". *Ainsworth* thus has no application in determining the current scope of the phrase "proceedings in the Assembly" under s 9 of the POQ Act.

**B. Whether the Report itself is protected by parliamentary privilege**

24. On 6 October 2020, the Commission provided to the Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee (**the PCCC**) a document (**the Report**). The Report itself is plainly part of the proceedings in the Assembly. It is, pursuant to s 9(2)(d), "a document… presented or submitted to… a committee".

25. The Commission, at paragraphs 52 – 56 of its submissions, makes an argument to the effect that:

    (a) the Report has been submitted to the PCCC and is in its possession, and is thus part of the proceedings of the Assembly;

    (b) what the PCCC does with the Report cannot be impeached simply because the document is *ultra vires* the *Crime and Corruption Act* 2001 (Qld) (**CC Act**), as that is plainly a trespass into the legislature's exclusive control of its own affairs;[17] and

    (c) accordingly, the PCCC can deal with the Report as it sees fit without intervention of the Court.

26. The Speaker endorses those submissions. For those reasons, the Report is part of the proceedings in the Assembly and a court cannot make a declaration which prohibits the PCCC from dealing with the Report in a particular way.

27. However, the appeal presents a further question of whether the <u>preparation</u> of the Report is part of the "proceedings in the Assembly" and thus covered by parliamentary privilege. At first instance and on appeal, Mr Carne complained that

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[16] As confirmed by the Explanatory Note to the Parliament of Queensland Bill 2001 at p 9.
[17] Citing CAB 111: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [199]–[200] (Freeburn J).

the Commission failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness in the preparation of the Report, and sought a declaration that the Commission, in reporting adversely on Mr Carne in the Report, failed to observe those requirements.[18] If the Report's preparation is not protected by parliamentary privilege, then it might be open for Mr Carne to seek a declaration about those claimed failures to observe procedural fairness during its preparation.

**C. Whether the preparation of the Report is protected by parliamentary privilege**

28. The preparation of the Report was part of the proceedings of the Assembly pursuant to s 9(2)(e) of the POQ Act, read with s 9(2)(c).

29. Reading the relevant parts of those two paragraphs together, they provide that for a document to amount to proceedings in the Assembly, it must be established that the document was prepared "for the purposes of, or incidental to, transacting [the] business" of "presenting or submitting a document to the Assembly, a committee or an inquiry." It is well-established that the preparation does not need to be completed by a committee or a member of the Assembly themself; the protection is intended to cover those who prepare and provide a document for a committee or member to use in transacting Assembly business.[19]

30. The evidence at first instance established that the Report was prepared "for the purposes of… transacting business mentioned in paragraph… (c)", namely, the business of submitting the Report to the PCCC. The Statement of Agreed Facts, including its annexures, relevantly provided as follows:

    (a) There was a 19 June 2020 meeting between the chairpersons of the PCCC and the Commission. At the meeting, the PCCC Chair asked if the Commission was going to prepare a report into "this matter" because it seemed like "a cultural issue". The Chair of the Commission responded that they had not decided finally but considered "it is one that we should", and that after Mr Carne's show cause process had taken its course, "we probably should articulate some of the concerns that we had".[20]

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[18] CAB 23, 57: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [56]–[57]; [175]–[177]; CAB 62 (Notice of Appeal); CAB 67–68: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [13].
[19] *Erglis v Buckley (No 2)* [2005] 2 Qd R 407 at 418 – 419 [31].
[20] CAB 88: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [89(q)]; CAB 11: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [19]. This conversation was produced as part of a certificate issued pursuant to s 55 of the POQ Act.

(b) On 4 September 2020, the Commission sent a letter to Mr Carne's solicitors, enclosing a draft of the Report, and stating that the Commission "intends to publish a report on this investigation in accordance with section 69 of the [CC Act]".[21]

(c) There was an 11 September 2020 meeting between the Chair of the Commission and the PCCC. The PCCC Chair asked, "You will be seeking a direction under section 69 for the tabling of that report?" and the Commission Chair responded "Yes. That is where that is. In the Public Trustee matter we were in the same position. We were trying to get that to you today, but…".[22]

31. That the Report was prepared for the purpose of submitting it to the PCCC is the clear inference given the following statutory context and summary of the above-extracted agreed facts:

(a) under the CC Act, the PCCC has the functions of, *inter alia*, monitoring and reviewing the performance of the Commission's functions (s 292(a)) and examining the Commission's annual report and its other reports (s 292(c));

(b) prior to the Commission deciding whether to prepare a report, the PCCC Chair asked the Commission if it would prepare one, in terms which suggested he considered there would be utility in one being prepared to address "a cultural issue";

(c) the Commission effectively stated it intended to provide the Report to the PCCC about one month prior to it doing so; and

(d) the Chair of the PCCC was expecting the Report and monitored its progress.

32. Once it is established that the preparation of the Report fell within the terms of s 9(2)(e), because the Commission prepared it with the requisite intention or purpose in mind, the preparation of the Report becomes part of the "proceedings in the Assembly". The POQ Act does not require anything further be shown, such as an "appropriative act",[23] or that the Report was prepared lawfully.

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[21] CAB 88: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [89(s)]; CAB 11–12: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [21].
[22] CAB 12 – 13: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [23]; see also CAB 89: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [89(u)]. This conversation was produced as part of a certificate issued pursuant to s 55 of the POQ Act.
[23] See CAB 102 – 104: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [152] – [160] (Freeburn J); CAB 45: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2021] QSC 228 at [120].

*No requirement for an appropriative act*

33. The Court of Appeal's reasoning in *Erglis v Buckley (No 2)* [2005] 2 Qd R 407 (***Erglis***) is not contrary to this view of s 9(2) of the POQ Act. In *Erglis*, the Health Minister met with a group of nurses and promised that, if the nurses prepared a statement and provided it to her, she would read it out in the Assembly. The nurses prepared the letter, supplied it to the Minister, and it was read out. They were sued for defamation. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the preparation and submission of the letter to the Minister was covered by privilege. McPherson JA, with Dutney J agreeing, found that the preparation of the letter by the nurses was covered by parliamentary privilege. His Honour said:

> This, as will be seen, has the consequence of extending the protection to persons who are not themselves members of Parliament; but it seems to me that such an extension is, in the circumstances of this case, necessarily implicit in the statutory provisions themselves. Sections 8 and 9 of the Act do not in terms confine the privilege to members of Parliament themselves. That is consistent with the nature of the privilege as it has been judicially characterised in the past. It is well settled that it belongs not to the individual member but is the privilege of Parliament as a whole… Furthermore… it would be wrong to assume that the protection afforded by, for example, s. 9(2)(e), is restricted to only to a member of the Assembly who prepares the document himself or herself; the protection must be intended to cover those who prepare and provide the document for him or her to use in transacting the business of the Assembly.[24] [underlining added]

34. His Honour continued:

> [The trial judge] therefore concluded, as I think correctly, that the Legislative Assembly in this case through [the Health] Minister, "brought the acts of the defendants into its proceedings when she undertook to read out the proposed letter in the Assembly"; but, his Honour went on, "it was clear from what she told the people at the meeting that their part in the proceedings would be complete once she received the letter by the deadline she gave them".[25]

35. Jerrard JA, agreeing in the result, said it was not necessary as a matter for law for the Minister to have solicited the letter in order for it to attract privilege.[26]

36. The judgment of McPherson JA should not be read as requiring a Member of the Assembly to invite the provision of a document or perform some other appropriative act before the document's preparation will be privileged. The most significant issue on appeal was whether the preparation of documents by persons other than Members

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[24] *Erglis v Buckley (No 2)* [2005] 2 Qd R 407 at 418–419 [31].
[25] *Erglis v Buckley (No 2)* [2005] 2 Qd R 407 at 419 [32].
[26] *Erglis v Buckley (No 2)* [2005] 2 Qd R 407 at 443 [101].

of Parliament could be privileged, with the Court answering in the affirmative. A better reading of McPherson JA's judgment is that the invitation from the Minister was decisive because it strongly supported the inference that the nurses prepared the document for the purpose of presenting or submitting it to the Assembly. It thus served as powerful evidence that the preparation of the letter was within the terms of s 9(2)(e) of the POQ Act. At no point did the Court provide that an appropriative act was a minimum requirement. The Minister's invitation was simply sufficient proof of the authors' purpose in preparing the letter in the circumstances of that case. The Speaker submits that direct evidence that the nurses prepared the letter for the purpose of providing it to the Minister with a request that she read it out in the Assembly would also have met that requirement.

37. Contrary to concerns such as those expressed in *Rowley v O'Chee*,[27] the preparation of documents like "junk mail" which happen to be later delivered to a member's address or sent to a committee's email will not be privileged. This is because they are not actually prepared for the purpose of being submitted or presented to the Assembly or a committee.

*Lawfulness of the Report's preparation*

38. Moreover, the POQ Act does not impose any requirements as to the lawfulness of the preparation of the document for it to be part of the "proceedings in the Assembly". The Speaker would not contest the argument in paragraphs 68 – 89 of the Commission's submissions to the effect that the Report is a "report" for the purposes of s 69 of the CC Act, but does not seek to be heard on that question. Fundamentally, however, there is no requirement that the Report be a "report" for the purposes of s 69 of the CC Act for the Report's preparation to be part of the "proceedings in the Assembly".

39. The language of s 9 does not impose such a requirement, and there is no such requirement at general law. That is consistent with the approach of McPherson JA in *CJC v PCJC*:[28]

> The starting point is not, as the appellants' submissions would have it, to question whether the parliamentary proceeding is lawful to see whether it qualifies for privilege. Such an approach would have the consequence that parliamentary privilege could be abrogated by the mere assertion of

[27] [2001] 1 Qd R 207 at 221 (McPherson JA), as discussed in CAB 103: *Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission* [2022] QCA 141 at [154] (Freeburn J).
[28] [2002] 2 Qd R 8 at 27–28 [47].

> unlawfulness attaching to some aspect of the parliamentary proceedings sought to be challenged. The question whether or not the impugned conduct was unlawful would first be litigated to determine whether the proceeding was ''lawful'' and thus privileged. To a large extent the courts, not Parliament, would determine the extent of parliamentary privilege. This is contrary to history and authority.

40. The Speaker submits that the only inquiry the Court can engage in, in order to determine whether the preparation of the Report is part of the "proceedings in the Assembly", is whether it meets the description in s 9 of the POQ Act. Once it does, the Court's inquiry as to whether the preparation of the Report is privileged ends.

41. Ultimately, the preparation of the Report plainly met the terms of s 9(2)(e) of the POQ Act. It is therefore part of the proceedings in the Assembly. There is no basis for the Court to make a declaration about whether the requirements of procedural fairness were met in its preparation.

**D. Conclusion**

42. The scope of parliamentary privilege in Queensland is ultimately determined by s 9 of the POQ Act, which largely replicates s 3 of the *Parliamentary Papers Act*. Both the Report and its preparation are plainly covered by the statutory meaning of "proceedings in the Assembly". The Court is therefore precluded from making any declaration about the Report's preparation or how the PCCC may deal with the Report.

**Part V: Time Estimate**

43. The Speaker estimates he will require half an hour to present oral argument.

Dated 23 February 2023

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRISBANE REGISTRY No B66 of 2022

BETWEEN: **CRIME AND CORRUPTION COMMISSION**

Appellant

and

**PETER DAMIEN CARNE**

Respondent

ANNEXURE TO THE INTERVENER'S SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF QUEENSLAND

Pursuant to Practice Direction No 1 of 2019, the Speaker sets out below a list of the statutes and provisions referred to in these submissions.

| No. | Description | Version | Provisions |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | *Constitution Act* 1867 (Qld) | Version effective from 8 June 1978 | s 40A |
| 2 | *Constitution Act Amendment Act* 1978 (Qld) | As passed | - |
| 3 | *Crime and Corruption Act* 2001 (Qld) | Current (reprint effective date 25 May 2020) | s 69 |
| 4 | *Criminal Justice Act* 1989 (Qld) | As passed | s 2.18 |
| 5 | *Imperial Acts Application Act* 1984 (Qld) | As passed | s 5 |
| 6 | *Parliamentary Papers Act* 1992 (Qld) | As passed | s 3 |
| 7 | *Parliament of Queensland Act 2001* (Qld) | Reprint effective date 7 September 2020 | ss 8, 9, 14, 55, 82, 84(b), 87 |